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ABSTACT 
 
We use a simple combinatorial model of technological change to explain the Industrial 
Revolution.   The Industrial Revolution was a sudden large improvement in technology, which 
resulted in significant increases in human wealth and life spans. In our model, technological 
change is combining or modifying earlier goods to produce new goods.  The underlying process, 
which has been the same for at least 200,000 years, was sure to produce a very long period of 
relatively slow change followed with probability one by a combinatorial explosion and sudden 
takeoff.  Thus, in our model, after many millennia of relative quiescence in wealth and 
technology, a combinatorial explosion created the sudden takeoff of the Industrial Revolution. 
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In the classical article “Evolution and Tinkering,” François Jacob said natural selection “works 
like a tinkerer – a tinkerer who does not know exactly what he is going to produce but uses 
whatever he finds around him whether it be pieces of string, fragments of wood or old 
cardboards; in short it works like a tinkerer who uses everything at his disposal to produce some 
kind of workable object.”  Unlike the engineer, who needs “tools that exactly fit his project,” the 
tinkerer “always manages with odds and ends.”  Evolution as tinkering has proven a successful 
metaphor (1, 2). We apply the idea of tinkering where it is not metaphoric: the evolution of 
technology.  We use a simple combinatorial model of technological change to explain the 
Industrial Revolution.    
After the emergence of anatomically modern humans, perhaps about 200,000 years ago 
(3, 4, 5, 6), income levels changed relatively little until the 19th century (C.E.) when rapid 
technological change produced a spike in per capita incomes first in Europe and North America 
and then globally.  This spike in incomes supported a corresponding spike in global population. 
(See Figures One and Two). This “hockey stick” of economic growth is the central problem of 
social science.  The Industrial Revolution was the movement from “a traditional world in which 
incomes of ordinary working people remained low and fairly stable over the centuries” to “a 
modern world where incomes increase for every new generation” (7).  The central question of 
social science is, then, Why was there a long period of relative stagnation followed by a sudden 
takeoff producing rapid technological change, sustained growth, and unprecedentedly high 
incomes?  We show that if technological advance is a result of tinkering and recombination, then 
it may proceed slowly for a long time before a combinatorial explosion generates a rapid 
increase in the variety of goods and a corresponding increase in wealth. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure One 
GDP per capita over the long run. Calculated using data from (8) and (31,32).  
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Figure Two 
World population from 10,000 BC to the present. Data and estimates derived from (31, 32). 
 
The industrial revolution 
Prior to the Industrial Revolution global GDP per capita fluctuated between about 450 and 700 
1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.  Already by 1870 (C.E.) this number had risen to about 870, and 
thus above historical levels.  Global GDP per capita in 2008 was over $7,600, which is about 11 
to 17 times larger than historical values.  In other words, global per capita GDP today is at least 
an order of magnitude larger than historical levels.  In the richer countries, GDP per capita in 
2008 varied between about 20,000 and 30,000 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars (8).  Some evidence 
suggests that our Pleistocene ancestors may have had a standard of life not inferior to historical 
levels prior to the Industrial Revolution (9).  If so, the Industrial Revolution had a far greater 
effect on incomes than the advent of agriculture and civilization.  Some scholars have found 
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evidence that localized regions such as Northern Italy may have reach relatively high incomes 
well before the industrial revolution (10-14).  Even if all of these recent results were right, 
however, they would seem to imply little or no change in the basic picture of extended stagnation 
followed by sudden take off around 1800.  
Explanations of the Industrial Revolution include, inter alia, exploitation of the worker 
by the capitalist (15), Calvinism stimulating the emergence of a unique capitalistic form of 
economic rationality (16, 17), the emergence of trade-friendly institutions initially brought on by 
England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 (18), the predominance of Christianity in Western 
culture (19), genetically determined increases in “the average quality in the population” (20), the 
supposed beneficial eugenic consequences of English primogeniture (9), and a shift in the 
perceived dignity of commercial activity (21).  Each of these explanations appeals to a special 
cause (or combination of causes) of the Industrial Revolution, and none has emerged as the 
predominant or consensus view. 
We propose a radically different explanation of the Industrial Revolution.  Ours is a 
deflationary explanation.  It deflates competing views that depend on some special cause or 
combination of causes to account for the sudden takeoff of the Industrial Revolution.  Takeoff 
might have occurred in another time or place.  Its occurrence in late 18th and early 19th century 
England is largely accidental and independent of any special cultural, institutional, or genetic 
causes present uniquely in that time and place. In our model, median income is largely 
unchanging for a long time before a sudden technological takeoff produces increasingly rapid 
economic growth.  We show that this hockey-stick pattern of economic growth can be explained 
without appeal to any supposed special causes.   “Modern growth theory” in economics provides 
models of the industrial revolution that might also be considered deflationary.  We will consider 
such models after developing our simple model of technological change. 
Our model provides a clear mechanism of technological change, which is robust to the 
institutional context of human exchange.  This simple mechanism predates the emergence of 
anatomically modern man.  In our model, the same mechanism of technological change has been 
operative since the arrival of composite tools about 300,000 years ago, which is probably about 
100,000 years prior to the arrival of anatomically modern humans. 
 
The model 
We model technological progress as increasing “cambiodiversity” (22), that is, as increases in 
the variety of goods. Increasing cambiodiversity is a characteristic feature of economic growth 
(23-28). In any period, there is a fixed probability that any one good may be modified to produce 
a new value-enhancing good, and smaller but still fixed probabilities that 2, 3, or n goods may be 
combined to produce a new value-enhancing good.  Modifications in Paleolithic hand axes (29) 
and in 17th and18th century American axes (30) illustrate how an individual good may be 
modified to produce a new value-enhancing good.  Powered heavier than air flight illustrates 
how two distinct goods – gliders and internal combustion engines – may be combined to produce 
a new value-enhancing good, the airplane.  In our combinatorial model of technological 
evolution new types of goods may be generated when tinkerers modify an existing good or 
cobble together two or more existing goods to come up with some new twist or combination that, 
with all its imperfections and inelegancies, works well enough to be an improvement. 
Let 𝑀" denote the number of distinct types of goods in the economy at time t.  𝑀" is the 
degree of cambiodiversity.  Our assumption of fixed probabilities of combining n goods to 
produce a new value-enhancing good leads to the simple combinatorial model given in equation 
(1) below. 
 
𝑀"#$ − 𝑀" = 𝑃 𝛼) *+)*+),$        (1) 
 
where 0 < 𝑃𝛼) < 1 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑀" and 𝛼)#$ ≤ 𝛼) for 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑀" − 1.   (In practice, we 
set 𝛼) = 0 for 𝑖 > 4.)  𝑃𝛼) is the probability that if *+) = *+!)! *+8) !  goods are combined they will 
result in a new good. For simplicity, we take equation (1) to describe the net increase in 
cambiodiversity rather than separately modeling additions and subtractions to the variety of 
goods under production.   
There is a random element in the emergence of new goods, as reflected in the parameters 
P and 𝛼).  And it may be that many attempts to generate new goods are best viewed as random.  
But only value-enhancing goods will have an enduring place in the econosphere, and it only 
these value-enhancing goods that we are considering in Equation One.  
The fact that only value-enhancing goods will be produced may not be immediately 
obvious.  But if the purpose of production is consumption, then people will not generally have an 
incentive to engage in consumption-reducing activities.  They will not produce a new and 
innovative good unless it displaces goods of lower value. Production of the new good will 
consume resources such as human labor that would otherwise have gone into producing other 
things including, perhaps, leisure.  Thus, whenever a value-enhancing good is added to the 
system, the overall economic output, GDP, goes up.  While errors can and will happen, of course, 
the tendency is always to produce only such innovative new goods as can cover their opportunity 
costs with at least some surplus.   
 
 
Figure Three 
 𝑀" (y-axis), scaled from 0 to 2015 (x-axis). 
   
 
Our simple model exhibits the characteristic “hockey stick” shape that any explanation of 
modern economic growth must exhibit.  See Figure Three.  A long period of largely unchanging 
values is followed by a sudden takeoff.  This behavior emerges from a very simple and 
unchanging stochastic process.  It is not necessary to explain takeoff as the product of some 
special cause or combination of causes.  A low but unchanging value of P will create a long 
period of stagnation, but sudden takeoff will eventually occur with probability one. 
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Our model exhibits takeoff in cambiodiversity, which is our measure of technology.  
Because the rate of increase in cambiodiversity is itself initially increasing, it must produce rapid 
increases in per capita income, though perhaps with a delay. Similarly, a model with 
cambiodiversity representing technology exhibits no long-term steady state growth rates of 
output or capital. Output and capital growth rates are exponential instead of constant. Below we 
add our model of technological change to a simplified version of a standard “unified model” 
from the economics literature on “modern growth theory.”  There is diversity in such models and, 
more generally, there is an indefinite host of particular mechanisms that might translate 
technological change into increases in population and per capita income.  It seems worthwhile, 
therefore, to first offer some general considerations to explain why technological takeoff will 
necessarily bring incomes and population up as well.   
With an unchanging population, an increase in cambiodiversity would imply a 
corresponding increase in per capita income.  But if the population is initially at low income 
levels, then the greater abundance brought about by increased cambiodiversity may be translated 
into an increase in population size without much changing GDP per capita.  And, indeed, before 
the Industrial Revolution increases in GDP seem to have often, perhaps typically, produced 
precisely such “Malthusian” income-offsetting increases in population.  But technological 
takeoff produces such a rapid increase in GDP that population cannot rise fast enough to keep up 
with it.  It was thus inevitable that population and average income would both eventually rise 
precipitously along with cambiodiversity.   
Our simple combinatorial model, then, is a sufficient explanation for the Industrial 
Revolution as defined above.  It does not explain the demographic transition occurring after the 
takeoff in per capita GDP.  Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the bulk of the population lived at 
a relatively low income level, usually dubbed “the subsistence level.”  In this world, increases in 
per capita GDP led to increases in population that, in turn, returned per capita GDP to its 
supposed subsistence level.  The rapidly increasing cambiodiversity of the Industrial Revolution 
caused such rapid increase in GDP that household incomes rose despite population increases.  
Once incomes rose sufficiently above their subsistence levels, the relationship between income 
levels and population growth rates changed so that higher incomes now induce falling and not 
rising population growth rates.  This change is the “demographic transition.”  The rate of world 
population growth has been declining since about 1970.   
 
Modern growth theory 
In the “unified models” of “modern growth theory,” the system moves endogenously from a 
“Malthusian” regime of low growth and steady income to a “Post-Malthusian” regime of higher 
growth and increasing incomes to, finally, a “Modern Growth regime” of continued 
technological advance in which, however, population growth no longer increases with income, 
but instead declines (14, 33).  In these models, technological change is measured by a scalar 
whose rate of growth is influenced by the amount of prior knowledge investment.  The driver of 
change may be labeled “education,” “R&D,” “the number of people engaged in producing ideas,” 
(34), or something else.  In this sort of “idea-based theory of [economic] growth,” (34), resources 
are diverted from consumption or other productive activities and invested in knowledge 
production.  These models generally assume that “all knowledge resides in the head of some 
individual person and the knowledge of a firm, or economy, or any group of people is simply the 
knowledge of the individuals that comprise it” (35).  The mechanism linking such investments to 
technological change is vague or unspecified.   
The following model presents a “unified model” of this type.  We recognize that our 
model is as simplistic as it is simple.  Our goal is only to illustrate as simply as possible how our 
model of technological change can be integrated with existing economic models of growth to 
generate a “unified model” that conforms with the leading facts of economic history.  
In our simple discrete time model 𝑌" is world GDP in period t.  𝐾" is the capital stock in 
period t.  It is the value of all goods used to generate, ultimately, final output.  𝐿" is the stock of 
labor.  We assume each living person provides the same quantity of labor, which we normalize to 
one. Thus, 𝐿" is also the population in period t.  We measure technology by cambiodiversity, 𝑀".  
For this simple model, we assume that output is generated by an aggregate production function 
of the Cobb-Douglas type.  Thus, 
 𝑌" = 𝑀"𝐾"<𝐿"($8<) ,         (2) 
 
where beta is between 0 and 1. 
The capital stock, 𝐾", is increased by saving, which we assume to be a fixed fraction, s, of 
output.  It is diminished by use as, for example, when machines wear out over time.  This 
“depreciation” occurs at the fixed rate delta.  Thus, growth in the capital stock is described by the 
following equation. 
 
 𝐾"#$ = 𝑠𝑌" + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾",        (3) 
 
where s and 𝛿 are between 0 and 1. 
In the standard economic models of modern growth theory, the population growth rate is 
derived from the utility maximizing choices of individuals deciding how may children to have 
and how much to invest in each child.  For the sake of simplicity, and to focus on the 
cambiodiversity, we take population 𝐿" to be exogenous, derived in part from the estimates in 
(31) and augmented with numbers from the US Census Bureau.  
 We calibrate the model to reasonably fit growth in total world output from AD 1 to AD 
2015, adjusted for inflation and measured in 2011 international dollars (8). We require values for 
9 parameters to simulate the model. Following the economics literature, we choose 1/3 for 
capital’s share of output (31, 36) and values s = 0.25, delta = 0.06. 
 We assume that 𝛼) is a decreasing function as i increases, and that 𝛼) = 0 for 𝑖 > 4. In 
particular, we assume the decreasing function takes the form 
 
 𝛼) = $()	C)D , 𝑖 ≤ 40, 𝑖 > 4        (4) 
 
where 𝜃 > 0, 𝜌 > 0. The list of parameters is given in Table One. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Parameter Value(s) Comments 𝒀𝟎 1.82741×10$$ Total world GDP at t = 0 𝑴𝟎 
P 
50, 88 
~0.0006 
Number of distinct value-adding goods at t = 0 
The probability of a successful combination 𝜽 6 𝛼) = $()	C)D  is the probability that a combination of 𝑀" 
goods results in a new good 𝝆 2 𝛼) = $()	C)D  is the probability that a combination of 𝑀" 
goods results in a new good 𝑳𝟎 1.7×10Q Total world population at t = 0 𝜷 1/3 Capital’s share of output 
s 0.25 Fraction of output re-invested into capital formation 𝜹 0.06, 0 Capital depreciation rate 
 
Table One 
Baseline parameter values of the combinatorial growth model, defined by Equations (1), (2) and 
(3). Entries with comma-delimited values demonstrate more than one good candidate parameter. 
 
Figure Four shows the estimated progression of total world GDP from AD 1 to the 
present together with simulated values under three different parameterizations. Note that it is 
simple to extend the simulation backwards from AD 1, by decreasing the initial number of 
distinct goods 𝑀T. We consider it important that the model has validity before AD 1. Importantly, 
the capital stock 𝐾" should not shrink as output 𝑌" grows. We chose our parameters to ensure the 
model is coherent prior to AD 1.  The value of P in combination with the parameters 𝜃, 𝜌 (which 
determine 𝛼)) determine how easy or difficult it is to come up with viable products. A higher P, a 
lower 𝜃, or a lower 𝜌, all else equal, is correlated with a larger ∆𝑀" and therefore a larger ∆𝑌".  
  
 
 
 
Figure Four 
The top graph shows total world GDP (blue) plotted from AD 1 to AD 2015, together with 
the parameterization {𝑀T = 50, 𝛿 = 0.06} (yellow), {𝑀T = 50, 𝛿 = 0} (green), and {𝑀T =88, 𝛿 = 0.06} (red). The middle figure is the same graph, zoomed in to AD 1800 to AD 2015, to 
better visually differentiate between the parameterizations. The bottom figure is the same 
parameterizations plotted on a log GDP scale, from 350 BC to 2015 AD. 
 
 
Discussion 
We have proposed a deflationary theory of the Industrial Revolution.  Our theory deflates 
rivals that rely on some special cause.  In our model, the same stochastic process drives 
technological change from the earliest days to now.  There are other explanations that are at least 
somewhat deflationary, including some of the contributions to modern growth theory discussed 
above (33, 37). These models, however, neglect the central fact of cambiodiversity.  They 
assume relatively modern institutions of market exchange and are therefore not robust to 
institutions.  They assume self-conscious investments in innovation or research rather than 
tinkering and chance discovery.  And they do not have an explicit and satisfying mechanism of 
technological change.  Finally, we know of only one modern growth theory model that has been 
shown to generate hockey-stick growth in population, GDP, and income, and this model seems 
to achieve this result only at the cost of relatively high parameterization (34). 
If our basic model of technological change is correct, then the Industrial Revolution 
would seem to have been the inevitable consequence of the human propensities to tinker, talk 
and trade.  The presence of raw-material transfer distances well above likely maximum territorial 
radius in the Middle Stone Age suggests that grammatical language and long-distance exchange 
networks may have emerged 130,000 – 140,000 years ago, (3, 38). The co-evolution of language 
and trade may have been enabled about 300 kya by the arrival of composite tools, which are 
“conjunctions of at least three techno-units, involving the assembly of a handle or shaft, a stone 
insert, and binding materials” (29).  We have evidence, therefore, of an autocatalytic process in 
which increases in cambiodiversity enabled the growth of exchange networks, which, in turn, 
enabled further increases in cambiodiversity and further growth in exchange networks (24, 26).  
Mathusian population dynamics prevented increasing cambiodiversity from inducing increases in 
personal incomes until the combinatorial explosion of technological change finally overwhelmed 
population growth, thereby inducing sustained increases in per capita GDP. 
Our explanation might seem to neglect the important fact of predation, whereby some 
persons seize (perhaps violently) goods made by others without offering anything in exchange 
for them.  Such “grabbing,” as we may call it, discourages technological change.  Grabbing in 
medieval China, where “property was subject to expropriation by Confucian government 
officials in the name of the emperor,” has been used to explain why inventions did not often 
become innovations in that country (39). A story in Petronius’ Satyricon vividly illustrates the 
how grabbing may stifle innovation.  An artisan showed Caesar a cup he had made with 
malleable glass that could not be broken.  Once the emperor was satisfied that the artisan had not 
shared his secret with anyone else, he had the artisan killed on the spot, “for if the secret were 
known, we should think no more of gold than of mud” (40). In other words, the innovation 
threatened to drive down the price of the emperor’s gold.  Grabbing seems to be as ubiquitous in 
human life as trade.  While we do not separately model grabbing, we do not neglect it either.  
Grabbing reduces P, and thus the probability of generating a new good.  In a more fine-grained 
analysis we might attempt to plot the ups and down of P as innovation and grabbing interact and 
exhibit, perhaps, Lotka-Volterra dynamics.  In the end, however, the slow and steady power of 
even a very low P creates takeoff with probability one.  Thus, dropping our simplifying 
assumption of an unchanging P, thereby allowing for differing degrees of grabbing over time, 
would complicate the analysis without changing the most fundamental contours of our story.  
As we have seen, the demographic transition produced a slowdown in population growth.  
This has been a regime change in population growth.  It seems worth inquiring whether incomes 
and cambiodiversity might not be headed toward similar regime changes.  Some evidence 
suggests that we may be approaching a singularity, perhaps around 2050 (41).  We should also 
recognize, however, the risk of Chicken Littleism.  In a classic and important article of 1960, von 
Foerster et al. estimate that population growth will reach a singularity in 2026 (42).  With ironic 
false precision, they predict “doomsday” on Friday, 13 November 2026.  Their humor and irony 
notwithstanding, they seem to have been sincere in estimating that a population singularity 
would occur around 2026.  As we have seen, however, population growth rates began to fall 
within about a decade and well before reaching the pitch predicted by their model.  It seems, then, 
both important and difficult to decide whether we will approach a technological singularity, and 
if so when.  Nor is it easy to predict whether the regime change implied by a mathematical 
singularity would be doomsday or something less dire.  In this article, we have adopted the 
relatively easy task of explaining the past rather than the more daunting task of predicting the 
future.   
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